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† University Professor, The George Washington University. Executive Summary 
 
  In response to the events of 9/11 and to the development of new technologies, the 
government has enacted new measures to ensure public safety.  The article reviews these 
measures in regard to three communications technologies (cellular phones, the Internet, and high 
power encryption) and three communications surveillance technologies (Carnivore, the Key 
Logger System, and Magic Lantern).  The first three pose new difficulties for public authorities; 
the second three help them but might endanger people’s rights.  Drawing on a communitarian 
position that there must be a balance between individual rights and the public interest, the article 
reviews the said measures.  Although much of the debate is over whether or not governmental 
powers are excessive or insufficient, the article argues that the determining factor concerns 
accountability. If strong enough, powers that might otherwise be excessive might be acceptable. 
It examines the various ways accountability might take place. 
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  Are the new measures that have been introduced to protect America from terrorism too 
extensive, undermining our rights, or are they not extensive enough, leaving the nation 
vulnerable to future attacks? This article addresses these questions only with regard to those 
public safety measures, of the more than 150 introduced after 9/11/01,
1 that concern 
communications surveillance, and among these only the measures relevant to the use of six 
technologies: cellular phones, the Internet (as a means of communication), high power 
encryption, Carnivore, the Key Logger System, and Magic Lantern. The article examines the 
effects of these measures on the use of these technologies and on individual rights and the public 
interest. The main rights at issue are privacy, anonymity, and due process. The main areas of 
public interest at issue are public safety and public health, especially prevention of terrorism and 
response to terrorist attacks once they occur, including bio-terrorism. 
  The article takes for granted that both individual rights and public safety must be 
protected, and given that on many occasions advancing one requires some curtailment of the 
other, the key question is what is the proper balance between these two cardinal values. The 
concept of balance is found in the Constitution in the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment refers to people’s right not to be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure,
2 
hence recognizing a category of searches that are fully compatible with the Constitution: those 
that are reasonable. Historically, to be considered reasonable, searches have had to serve a 
compelling public interest, especially public safety or public health. 
  Much of the debate about the issues at hand in the public arena (by legislatures, opinion 
makers, and some legal scholars) is conducted in a format familiar in American court rooms: 
strong advocacy by opposing sides. Thus, one side argues that public safety requires new laws,  
regulations, and court rulings that would give the government greater surveillance powers, and 
                                                           
1. There were 161 separate provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 [hereinafter USA Patriot Act].  
2. US Const. amend. IV. 2 
 
warns that major calamities will strike if the government is not accorded these powers.
3 
Moreover, the advocates of public safety and health claim that the best way to defend liberty is to 
provide the government with more authority. Dead people are not free.  
  The other side does not oppose making concessions to public safety, but puts the onus on 
the government to prove that such concessions are needed and sets the bar very high for such 
proof, calling for an approach resembling “strict scrutiny.”
4 Although, in the debate since 
9/11/01, the civil libertarians’ opening position has been to demand a tighter definition of the 
conditions under which the new technologies can be applied and closer supervision of the 
expanded governmental powers, ultimately the classical civil libertarian position is that the 
government needs no additional powers, and moreover cannot be trusted to use any of them 
legitimately. 
  From the viewpoint of the paradigm used here, each side is speaking for one side of the 
needed balance rather than seeking to find the point (or better, zone)
5 at which a carefully crafted 
balance can be found between protecting the public interest and individual rights.  
  The quest for balance reflects a new (or responsive) communitarian position developed in 
the 1990s.
6 Its starting point is that there are two valid claims each society faces: the 
requirements of the public interest (which most obviously encompasses public safety and health, 
but also encompasses other elements of the common good, such as the protection of the 
                                                           
3. Senator Hatch, during the discussion of USA Patriot on the Senate floor warned:  
 
“I think of the civil liberties of those approximately 6,000 people who lost their lives, and potentially many others if 
we don’t give law enforcement the tools they need to do the job.”  
 
CONG. REC. S11023-11024 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
4. Nadine Strossen, Remarks at the Communitarian Dialogue on Privacy v. Public Safety (Nov. 26, 2001) (transcript 
available from the Communitarian Network) [hereinafter Strossen remarks]. 
5. I refer to a zone because I don’t claim that there is a precise point of balance one can identify at which the 
government tilts clearly in one direction of the other. 
6. For further detail on the responsive communitarian position, see the RESPONSIVE COMMUNITARIAN PLATFORM, 
available at http://www.communitariannetwork.org/platformtext.htm (last modified October 1991); AMITAI ETZIONI, 
THE NEW GOLDEN RULE (1996) [hereinafter The New Golden Rule]; AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 
(1999) [hereinafter The Limits of Privacy. For a critical treatment, see ELIZABETH FRAZER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
COMMUNITARIAN POLITICS (1999).   3 
 
environment) and the requirements of liberty (individual rights included).
7 The “turf” does not 
belong a priori to either claim. It is a gross misconception to argue that public safety measures 
entail a sacrifice of rights–or vice versa, that respecting individual rights entails sacrifices of the 
common good. First, in some situations, both can be advanced, such as when restoring law and 
order to a crime-ridden neighborhood or an anarchic country. Second, when the public interest 
and rights pose conflicting demands, criteria must be developed as to which should take priority, 
without assuming a priori that one automatically trumps the other.
8 Judge Richard Posner put the 
same basic idea in the following way: “I’ll call them the public-safety interest and the liberty 
interest. Neither, in my view, has priority. They are both important."
9 
  Such general positions are best examined within an historical context. There is a tendency 
by societies and polities to tilt in one direction or the other, to lean excessively toward the public 
interest or liberty. Moreover, corrections to such imbalances tend to lead to over-corrections. For 
example, the limitations the Church Commission imposed on the FBI in the 1970s, following the 
abuses of civil rights that occurred during the years J. Edgar Hoover was the director, seem to 
have excessively curbed the work of the agency in the following decades.
10 The public safety 
measures enacted since 9/11 have removed many of these restrictions and granted the FBI and 
other public authorities–such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
and the military–new powers, arguably titling excessively in the opposite direction. This over-
correction has been almost immediately followed by an attempt to correct it (e.g., limiting the 
conditions under which military tribunals can be used and spelling out procedures not included in 
their preliminary authorization).
11 At the same time, historical conditions change the point at 
which we find a proper balance; the 2001 assault on America and the threat of additional attacks 
constitute such a change.  
                                                           
7. See The New Golden Rule, supra note 6, chap. 1 and 2.  
8. For additional discussion of such criteria, see Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (1993), 177-90; The New 
Golden Rule, supra note 6, at 51-5; and The Limits of Privacy, supra note 6, at 10-5.  
9. Richard A. Posner, Security versus Civil Liberties, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 46. 
10. For a short overview of FBI abuses during the 1970s and the responses to them, see CONG. REC. S10992-10994 
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement by Sen. Leahy). 
11. Katharine Q. Seelye, Draft Rules for Tribunals Ease Worries, But Not All, NYTIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at B7. 4 
 
  The article proceeds by first introducing the relevant aspects of three of the six 
technologies–cellular telephones, the Internet, and encryption–which have expanded people’s 
free choices, and in this sense their liberties, but have limited the ability of public authorities to 
engage in the kind of activities they are legally entitled to engage in, especially intercepting 
communications following court approval. I shall refer to these technologies as liberalizing 
technologies. The article then examines the arguments in favor of and against changing laws and 
regulations to enable public authorities to cope with, if not overcome, the hurdles posed by the 
liberalizing technologies in the post-9/11 context. 
  The article then turns to the three new technologies that help public authorities– 
Carnivore, the Key Logger System, and Magic Lantern–which have the opposite profile of the 
first three: they enhance public safety but are feared to curb people’s rights. I refer to these as 
public protective technologies. These technologies are then also examined with regard to new 
laws and regulations and to their effect on the balance between the public interest and individual 
rights in the post-9/11 context. 
  Section III of the article calls attention to measures that might help increase public safety 
while minimizing the threat to individual rights, focusing on the concept of accountability. It 
should be noted from the outset, the position outlined entails a measure of trust in the 
government, or at least in some elements of it. 
 
I.  NEW LIBERALIZING TECHNOLOGIES 
A.  New and multiple means of communication 
  Before the discussion can proceed, it is essential to note that no attempt is being made 
here to describe fully or to analyze the technologies at issue, but merely to point to features of 
them relevant to the issues at hand. The year 1980 is used as a baseline. At the time, the most 
convenient, and by far the most commonly used, way to communicate instantaneously with a 
person at a different location was through a wired telephone. Cellular phones existed, but they 
were not yet commercially viable nor were they available in models lightweight enough to put in 
a pocket.
12 Fax machines had not yet come into wide use.
13 Telegraphs required, as a rule, going 
                                                           
12. JAMES MURRY, WIRELESS NATION (2001) [hereinafter Murry] at 20, 313. 5 
 
to a post office or Western Union location. Most people had one phone line, even if they had 
more than one extension. The Internet was still the ARPANET, a government-sponsored network 
linking mainly universities and research centers.
14 In 1980, all necessary communications 
surveillance could be carried out easily by attaching simple devices to a suspect’s one landline 
telephone.
15  
  In the following two decades, many millions of people acquired several alternative modes 
of convenient, instantaneous communication, most significantly cellular telephones and e-mail. 
By July 2000, there were over 100 million cell phone subscribers in the United States.
16 E-mail 
and Internet usage are similarly pervasive. Nielsen/Net Rating estimated that in July of 2001, 
165.2 million people in the United States had home Internet access.
17 
  These technological developments greatly limited the ability of public authorities to 
conduct communications surveillance using traditional methods under old laws (those in effect 
before the passage of the USA Patriot Act). Attempts were made to apply old laws to new 
technologies, but they did not fit well. To proceed, it must be noted that there are two types of 
communications surveillance: public authorities get “pen register” and “trap and trace” orders to 
obtain only the numbers dialed to or from a specific telephone,
18 or they get full intercept orders 
to listen to the content of a telephone call.
19 Because the information involved in the first type is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13. According to Philip C. W. Sih, though early fax technology was developed in the 19
th century, and the US 
military began using well-developed fax machines during WWII, it was not until the 1970s that the integration of 
new modem, computer and telephone technologies created the circumstances for a “fax explosion.” PHILIP C.W. SIH, 
FAX POWER (1993), 1-5. 
14. PETER SALUS, CASTING THE NET (1995), 82-3. 
15. The decision in the Supreme Court case of United States v. New York Tel. Co. Notes that “a pen register is a 
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused 
when the dial on the telephone is released." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161  n.1 (1977). The 
decision in United States v. Giordano notes that a pen register is "usually installed at a central telephone facility 
[and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line" to which it is attached. United States v. Giordano, 
416 U.S. 505, 549 n. 1 (1974). 
16. Murry, supra note 12, at 20, 313.  
17. Nielsen/Net Rating for July 2001, available at www.nielsen-netrating.com, (last visited Dec. 6, 2001). 
18. 18 USC 3122, 3123. 
19. 18 USC 2518. 6 
 
less sensitive, these orders are much easier to get than the latter.
20 The terms “pen register” and 
“trap and trace” refer to the devices originally used to carry out the trace orders.
21 Though the 
technologies they refer to have been replaced, these terms are still commonly used. For the rest 
of this essay, the term “pen/trap” will be used to designate the type of communications 
surveillance that involves gathering only the numbers dialed to and from a telephone, or their e-
mail equivalent. The term “full” intercept will refer to wiretaps and other means of intercepting 
the full content of a communication. The term “communications surveillance” will include both 
pen/trap and full intercept orders. 
  The law governing full intercepts, contained in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1969,
22 required that court orders for intercepts specify the location of the 
communications device to be tapped and establish probable cause that evidence of criminal 
conduct could be collected by tapping that particular device. Hence, under this law, if a suspect 
shifted from one phone to another or used multiple phones, the government could not legally tap 
phones other than the one originally specified without obtaining a separate court order for each.
23 
Once criminals were able to obtain multiple cell phones and to “dispose of them as used 
tissues,”
24 investigations were greatly hindered by the lengthy process of obtaining numerous full 
intercept authorizations from the courts.
25 
                                                           
20. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) [hereinafter Smith] established that the use of a pen register to obtain 
the numbers dialed from a telephone did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore did not 
require a warrant. The court held that “it is doubtful that telephone users in general have any expectation of privacy 
regarding the numbers they dial, since they typically know that they must convey phone numbers to the telephone 
company and that the company has facilities for recording this information and does in fact record it for various 
legitimate business purposes.” 
21. Peter Swire writes: “The term ‘pen register’ comes from the old style for tracking all of the calls originating 
from a single telephone. At one point, the surveillance technology for wiretapped phones was based on the fact that 
rotary clicks would trigger movements of a pen on a piece of paper.” Peter Swire, Administration Wiretap Proposal 
Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ANALYSIS PAPER #3, AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO 
TERRORISM (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC) Oct. 3, 2001 [hereinafter Swire].  
22. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter Title III]. 
23. 18 U.S.C. 2518 (1)(b)(ii)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
24. Rep. Nancy Pelosi, on CNN Novak, Hunt and Shields. Oct. 27, 2001. 
25. Victoria Toensing Remarks at the Communitarian Dialogue on Privacy v. Public Safety (Nov. 26, 2001) 
(transcript available from the Communitarian Network) [hereinafter Toensing remarks]. 7 
 
  The rise of Internet-based communications further limited the ability of public authorities 
to conduct communications surveillance under the old laws. Because Title III did not originally 
apply to electronic communications, e-mail was often treated as analogous to an older form of 
communication in the courts.
26 Because e-mails used to largely travel over phone lines, laws 
governing interception or traces for telephones were extended to govern interception and traces 
of e-mails as well.
27 However, the language of the old legislation governing pen/trap orders was 
not clearly applicable to e-mail communications.
28 Though police used pen/trap orders to trace e-
mail messages, there was a possibility that a court would rule that e-mail did not fall under 
pen/trap orders if this was ever challenged in court.
29  
  Furthermore, deregulation of the telecommunications industry created additional 
complications in carrying out pen/trap orders. When the old legislation was enacted, a unified 
phone network made it easy to identify the source of a call.
30 But e-mail may pass through 
multiple service providers in different locations throughout the nation on its way from sender to 
recipient. This means that a service provider might only be able to inform public authorities that 
a message came from another service provider. In this case, public authorities would have to 
obtain a new court order from the jurisdiction of that provider to find out where the message 
came from.
31 Thus, until recently, if a message went through four providers, four court orders in 
four different jurisdictions would be needed to find out the origin of that message. 
                                                           
26. For a discussion of the various analogies applied, see Lt. Col. Joginder Dhillon & Lt. Col. Robert Smith, 
Defensive Information Operations and Domestic Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques. 56 
A.F.L. Rev. 135 (2001) [hereinafter Dhillon] at 149.  
27. Id.    
28. The United States Code defines a pen register as a "device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses 
which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached." 
18 U.S.C. 3127(3) (1994). 
29. Swire, supra note 21. 
30. Id.  
31. Field Guide on the New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation, available at: 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/DOJ_guidance.pdf section (last visited January 29, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ 
Field Guide], 216A. 8 
 
  As with pen/trap orders, the original laws governing full intercept orders did not initially 
apply to e-mail. However, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
32 extended the 
full intercept laws to apply to electronic communications.
33 E-mail messages differ from phone 
conversations in important ways that have made the old laws, at best, an imperfect fit.
34 E-mails 
do not travel over phone lines in discreet units that can just be plucked out. They are broken up 
into digital packets and travel through the Internet through different routes and mixed together 
with the packets of the messages of other users.
35 This creates a challenge for law enforcement 
agents attempting to intercept or trace the e-mail of just one user without violating the privacy of 
other users.
36 
  Problems also occurred when agents received the same search warrants to obtain saved e-
mail that they would use in any other physical search.
37 Under old laws, a warrant must be 
obtained from a judge in the jurisdiction where the search will take place.
38 E-mail, however, is 
not always stored on a personal computer, but often is stored remotely on the servers of Internet 
service providers (ISPs). This means that if a suspect, say, in New Jersey had e-mail stored on a 
                                                           
32. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) [hereinafter, ECPA]. 
33. The ECPA extended the section of the US Code requiring a court order to intercept oral or wire communications 
to include electronic communications.  18 USC 2511, as amended by ECPA  title I, secs. 101(b), (c)(1), (5), (6), (d), 
(f)[(1)], 102.   
34. For further discussion, see Terrence Berg, www.wildwest.gov: The Impact of the Internet on State Power to 
Enforce the Law, 2000 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1305; James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: 
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65 (1997); Dhillon, supra note 
25 ; Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communications Attributes Under the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 949 (March 1996); and Paul Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes to Authorize 
Government Collection of Information on Packet-Switched Networks, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2001). 
35. Christian David Hammel Schultz, Unrestricted Federal Agent: “Carnivore” and the Need to Revise the Pen 
Register Statute, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (June 2001), 1221-3.  
36. Swire supra note 21.  
37. See 18 U.S.C.A. 2703 (West 2000), which reads: (a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic 
storage. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the 
contents of an electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for 
more than 180 days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or 
equivalent State warrant.  
38.18 USC 2703(a). 9 
 
server located in, say, Silicon Valley, an agent would have to travel across the country to get a 
warrant to seize the e-mail.
39  
  In short, the introduction of both cellular phones and e-mail created new challenges to the 
ability of public authorities to conduct communications intercepts, even if they were fully 
authorized by a court–intercepts that had been an important tool of law enforcement. Another 
technological development has made communications intercepts much more difficult still. 
Before it is introduced, a brief digression. There is a tendency in parts of the literature on privacy 
to argue that new technological developments have gravely undermined privacy, if not killed it 
altogether.
40 In effect, though, the situation in this area is akin to an arms race: as new means of 
attack are developed, so are new means of defense, although in any given period one side or the 
other may be the leading beneficiary of new technological developments. 
  To return to our subject, a major technological development that greatly enhances 
privacy–and potentially sets back the ability of public authorities to intercept communications–is 
high power encryption.
41 Although codes have existed for thousands of years,
42 only over the last 
few have programmers developed encryption systems that use codes 128 bits or longer, which 
are said to be impossible to crack, even by the National Security Agency (NSA).
43 Moreover, 
these programs are readily available to private parties at low costs. Stewart Baker, former general 
counsel for the NSA, said that “encryption is virtually unbreakable by police today, with 
programs that can be bought for $15.”
44 Indeed, these programs are increasingly being routinely 
                                                           
39. DOJ Field Guide, supra note 30, section 220.  
40. An oft-repeated anecdote that illustrates the point: At the launch of Jini, a wireless device that has the potential 
to track a user’s movements, Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy responded to privacy concerns with the 
declaration that “You have zero privacy now. Get over it!” For a further discussion, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000).  
41. See The Limits of Privacy, supra note 6, chap. 3.  
42. Deborah Russell and G. T. Gangemi Sr., Encryption, in BUILDING IN BIG  BROTHER, 11 (Lance Hoffman 
ed.1995).  
43. Dorothy E. Denning and William E. Baugh Jr., Encryption and Evolving Technologies as Tools of Organized 
Crime and Terrorism (US Working Group on Organized Crime, National Strategy Information Center, 1997). . 
44. Jonathan Krim, High-tech RBI Tactics Raise Privacy Questions, The Washington Post, Aug. 14, 2001, at A01 
[hereinafter Krim]. 10 
 
built into computers.
45 This means that the privacy of encrypted messages is much higher than 
that of any messages historically sent by mail, phone, messenger, carrier pigeon, or other means.  
(The same encryption also allows the storing of information in one’s computer–personal or 
corporate–that is much better protected than it ever was under lock and key, or even in safes.)
46 
  High power encryption has caused a very major setback for law enforcement.
47 Even 
when granted a court order, public authorities simply seem unable to implement it.
48  
  The consequence of this development has been different from others created by new 
technologies. In contrast with the situation concerning the multiplication of means of expeditious 
communication, in which the main factor that constrained public authorities was the 
obsolescence of laws, in the case of high power encryption, the new technology imposes a 
barrier all its own. In the other instance, a change of law was sufficient to enable law 
enforcement to deal with the new challenges posed by the new technologies. Here, the horse was 
out of the barn by 9/11. It seems impossible to break high power encryption, whatever the courts 
may authorize.  
 
 
                                                           
45. STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT–SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2001) [hereinafter Levy], 310-11. 
46. In practice, if it difficult to make the information completely secure, just as it is difficult to completely delete 
files. For example, if the operating system needs to perform another task while an encryption application is in 
progress, if will halt the application temporarily and return to it later. Before it halts the program, it writes the 
encryption application, and its key, to disk as a safety measure. When the application is completed later, many users 
do not realize that a version of the unencrypted key will remain on the disk until the computer writes it over. BRUCE 
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, (1994), 148. 
47. FBI Director Louis J. Freeh stated that:  
 
“From 1995-1996, there was a two-fold increase (from 5 to 12) in the number of instances where the FBI’s court-
authorized electronic efforts were frustrated by the use of encryption that did not allow for law enforcement access.”  
 
Hearing on Encryption Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Louis J. 
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Freeh statement]. See also, The Limits of Privacy, 
supra note 6, chap. 3. 
48. I wrote “seems” because it is not possible to know whether the National Security Agency has found a way to 
decrypt high-power encryption. However, the great efforts made to gain keys reinforce the view that the NSA has 
failed in its endeavors to this effect.  11 
 
B.  Legal responses 
  All in all, these technological developments have provided law-abiding citizens and 
criminals, Americans and people of other nations, including terrorists, greater freedom to do as 
they choose, and in this sense they are “liberalizing.” At the same time, they have significantly 
hampered the ability of public authorities to conduct investigations. Some cyberspace enthusiasts 
welcomed these developments, hoping that cyberspace would be a self-regulating, government-
free space.
49 In contrast, public authorities clamored for changing the laws to enable them to act 
in the new “territory” as they do in the world of old-fashioned, landline telephones.
50 Their 
pressures led to some modifications in the law before the 2001 attack on America, although the 
most relevant changes in the law have occurred since. Both the pre- and post-9/11 changes to 
expand the relevant intercept powers of the authorities are next examined jointly. 
  
  1. Roving intercepts 
  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) attempted to update the 
laws governing communications intercepts to be able to deal with the limitations put on them by 
the  technological developments already discussed by allowing for what are known as “roving 
wiretaps” in criminal investigations.
51 Roving wiretaps are full intercept orders that apply to a 
particular person, rather than to a specific communications device. They allow law enforcement 
to obtain a court order to intercept that person’s communications, without specifying in advance 
                                                           
49. See John Perry Barlow, Cyberspace Independence Declaration, issued Feb. 9 1996, available at 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited on January 22, 2002); and Steven Levy, The Battle 
of the Clipper Chip, NY TIMES, 12 June 1994. 
50. FBI Director Louis J. Freeh testified that:  
 
“The looming specter of the widespread use of robust, virtually untraceable encryption is one of the most difficult 
problems confronting law enforcement as the next century approaches. At stake are some of our most valuable and 
reliable investigative techniques, and the public safety of our citizens. We believe that unless a balanced approach to 
encryption is adopted that includes a viable key management infrastructure, the ability of law enforcement to 
investigate and sometimes prevent the most serious crimes and terrorism will be severely impaired.” 
 
Freeh statement, supra note 48.  
51. Roving wiretaps were initially introduced in the ECPA, supra note 31. 12 
 
which facilities will be tapped, allowing officers to intercept communications from any phone or 
computer that the person uses.
52  
  The process for obtaining a roving intercept order is more rigorous than that for obtaining 
the old kind of phone-specific order. The Attorney General’s office must approve the application 
before it is even brought before a judge.
53 Originally, the applicant had to show that the suspect 
named in the application was changing phones or modems frequently with the purpose of 
thwarting interception,
54 but the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 made it 
easier to obtain a roving intercept order by replacing the requirement to show “purpose to 
thwart” with the requirement to show that the suspect is changing phones or modems frequently, 
and that this practice “could have the effect of thwarting” the investigation.
55 Although roving 
intercepts have not yet been tested in the Supreme Court, several federal courts have found them 
constitutional.
56 
  Prior to 9/11, the FBI could not gain authorization for using roving intercepts in gathering 
foreign intelligence or in investigations of terrorism. The USA Patriot Act allows for such roving 
intercept orders to be granted under the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
57 FISA 
was passed in 1978 and provides the guidelines under which the executive branch–not only the 
president but also the Department of Justice–can obtain authorization to conduct surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes.
58 Agents who wish to conduct surveillance under FISA submit an 
application first to the Attorney General’s office, which must approve all requests (as with 
                                                           
52. 18 U.S.C. 2518 (11)(b) (1994 Supp. IV). The addition of this section was part of the ECPA. 
53. 18 USC 2518 (11)(b)(i) (1994 Supp. IV). 
54. 18 USC 2518 (11)(b) (1994).  
55. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 604, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998), 
amending 18 USC 2518 (11)(b)(1994). 
56. The most significant case is that of United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter 
Petti]. For further discussion see also Bryan R. Faller, The 1998 Amendment to the Roving Wiretap Statute: 
Congress "Could Have" Done Better, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2093 (1999).  
57. USA Patriot Act, supra note 1, section 206 (amending 50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)).  
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Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95
th Congress, 1t Sess. 13 (1977), reprinted in 1978 ISKCON 
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roving intercepts under ECPA). If the Attorney General finds the application valid, it will be 
taken to one of seven federally appointed judges, who together make up the Federal Intelligence 
and Security Court (FISC), for approval. The FISC allows no spectators, keeps most proceedings 
secret, and hears only the government side of a case.
59  
  Initially, FISA was limited to investigations for which foreign intelligence was the sole 
purpose. USA Patriot modifies FISA so that foreign intelligence need be only a “significant 
purpose” of an investigation.
60 This change effectively allows FISA to be used as part of “multi-
faceted responses to terrorism, which involves foreign intelligence and criminal 
investigations.”
61 Because FISA was originally designed for use in gathering foreign 
intelligence, communications surveillance conducted under FISA differs from that conducted 
under Title III criminal investigations in several other ways. Under normal Title III intercepts, 
anyone whose communications have been intercepted has to be notified after the fact that this 
happened. Under FISA, people do not have to be notified unless evidence obtained through the 
interception is to be used against them in court.
62 When FISA evidence is used in court, it is 
difficult for the defendant to challenge it because he or she cannot see the information agents 
relied on in making the application for surveillance–this is secret for national security reasons.
63  
  
  2.  E-mail surveillance 
  USA Patriot includes provisions to make it easier for public authorities to trace or seize e-
mail messages. It explicitly allows pen/trap orders for computer communications (as already 
discussed, previous orders had to rely on stretched interpretations of the statutes governing 
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CONG. REC. S11004. 
61. Department of Justice overview of the USA Patriot Act, as entered into the CONG. REC. S 11055 (daily ed. Oct. 
25, 2001) [hereinafter DOJ Overview].  
62. 50 USC 1806. 
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pen/trap for telephones).
64 Traces on telephone lines can usually be fulfilled by the local phone 
company that issued the line. Tracing e-mail messages, which travel through a variety of routes 
and may go through multiple carriers, often requires access at different points across the 
country.
65 As previously explained, following the phone model requires gaining warrants in 
several locations in order to trace one e-mail message. USA Patriot establishes what are de facto 
nationwide pen/trap orders,
66 allowing one court order to be used on all the carriers through 
which messages from an individual pass. When a law enforcement agent discovers that an e-mail 
message was forwarded to (or from) any carrier, he can serve the original court order to this 
carrier without getting an additional order from the court in whose jurisdiction the carrier is 
located. Moreover, because agents cannot know in advance which carriers will be involved, the 
court order needs to specify only the initial facility at which the pen/trap order will be carried 
out.  
  USA Patriot also allows a judge in the district with jurisdiction over the crime under 
investigation to grant search warrants to seize electronic communications stored outside that 
judge’s jurisdiction.
67 This means that an agent can obtain a warrant from a judge in the 
jurisdiction where the investigation is taking place to seize e-mail stored by an ISP physically 
located in another jurisdiction.
68 
  
  3.  Dealing with encryption 
  Previous administrations tried to have “back doors” built into encryption software that 
would enable public authorities, when needed, to decrypt reportedly unbreakable codes.
69 They 
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also attempted to get legislation passed that would require users to deposit a copy of their key 
with third parties (referred to as “escrow”) or public authorities, who would not be able to look at 
or use the key unless authorized to do so as part of an investigation.
70 A combination of civil 
liberties groups and high-tech corporations successfully fought off both of these attempts.
71 No 
attempts to deal with this matter were included in the USA Patriot Act. Further discussion of law 
enforcement tools to cope with encryption must be deferred until the public protective 
technologies are discussed. 
  
  4. Evaluating the changes in the law 
  a. General 
  The adaptations of the laws governing communications surveillance (which includes both 
pen/trap and full intercept orders) and seizures of stored communications have been subject to 
both general and detailed debates by the adversarial advocates already mentioned. On the general 
level, these adaptations were lumped together with numerous other matters including indefinite 
detention of aliens,
72 allowing the government to listen in on attorney-client conversations,
73 and 
military tribunals.
74 The nature of the debate on this level is illustrated by statements such as 
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Senator Patrick Leahy’s that some of the measures are “shredding the Constitution”
75 and 
Morton Halperin’s reference to the legislation as “Striking Terror at Civil Liberty.”
76 On the 
other side, Senator Hatch dismissed such misgivings as “hysterical concerns” and said the 
American people do not want to see Congress “quibble about whether we should provide more 
rights than the Constitution requires to the criminals and terrorists who are devoted to killing our 
people."
77 Attorney General John Ashcroft suggested that criticisms of the new powers being 
requested by the executive branch serve only to “aid terrorists” and “erode our national unity and 
diminish our resolve.”
78 
  b. Fourth Amendment issues 
  There has been some debate in the courts and among legal scholars as to how to apply the 
Fourth Amendment to the new technologies, as well as to the constitutionality of the new 
legislation governing these technologies.  
  Before 1967, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a literal way, as 
applying only to physical searches. In the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, the Court took 
a strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and ruled that telephone wiretaps did not 
constitute a search unless public authorities entered a home to install the device and that 
therefore the Fourth Amendment did not apply to them.
79 The justices wrote in their decision that 
a person is not protected under the Fourth Amendment unless “there has been an official search 
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and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible effects, or an actual 
physical invasion of his house.”
80 
  In 1967, the Court replaced this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment with the view 
that it “protects people, not places.”
81 In Katz v. United States, the Court established a new 
guideline for determining what falls under the protection of the Fourth Amendment and one that 
is still in use today–that of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
82 Justice Harlan, in his 
concurring opinion, set out a two-part test for determining if Fourth Amendment protection 
applies: the individual must have shown an expectation of privacy, and society must recognize 
that expectation as reasonable.
83  
  Legal scholars have criticized reasonable expectation as the cornerstone of the legal 
privacy doctrine on a number of grounds that need no reviewing here,
84 but the doctrine is 
generally still used as a guiding principle. As new technologies emerge, however, the question of 
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy has to be reexamined in this new context. In 
the 1996 case of United States v. Maxwell, the courts determined that there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for e-mail stored on a server,
85 giving this e-mail, in essence, the same 
protections given to paper documents stored in an office. In the case of United States v. 
Charbonneau, however, the courts determined that the extent to which one can expect privacy in 
e-mail communications depends on the context of the situation.
86 
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  Lt. Col. Joginder Dhillon and Lt. Col. Robert Smith argue that because e-mail messages 
reside on numerous servers between the sending and receiving server, and because on many 
networks duplicate copies of all e-mails are sent to the system administrator, there may not be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail.
87 This interpretation is backed up by the Supreme 
Court case Smith v. Maryland, in which the Court found that there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy for the telephone numbers one dials because those numbers must be conveyed to the 
phone company.
88 Dhillon and Smith conclude that, at the very least, Smith v. Maryland should 
mean that recording the addressing information of e-mail does not require a full intercept order.
89  
  There is some question as to whether or not roving intercepts are in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The requirement that intercept orders specify the 
place of the intercept comes from the Fourth Amendment, which states that “no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
90 Because roving intercepts do not 
name the location to be tapped, there is some question as to whether or not they are constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.   
  The argument in favor of their constitutionality is that the particularity of the person to be 
tapped is substituted for the particularity of the place to be tapped. In the case of United States v. 
Petti, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the use of roving intercepts, arguing that the 
purpose of the particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.
91 So long as a warrant 
or court order provides “sufficient particularity to enable the executing officer to locate and 
identify the premises with reasonable effort” and there is no “reasonable probability that another 
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premise might be mistakenly searched,” it is in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
92 A 
court order to tap all phones used by a specific person does describe particular places, but in an 
unconventional way. Public authorities cannot use the order to tap any location they wish, but 
only a set of specific locations, which they can show are used by a specific person.
93 
  Not everyone agrees that this substitution of particularity of person for particularity of 
place is sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Tracey Maclin cites the Supreme Court case 
of Steagald v. United States in which the Court concluded that an arrest warrant that specifies a 
person cannot be used to search private places not named in the warrant in pursuit of that 
person.
94 She interprets this decision to mean that the Court found warrants to be flawed that 
specify only the target of the search, but leave police to determine which particular locations to 
search. Maclin argues that although roving intercepts are issued for one person, once public 
authorities decide to “tap” a telephone or computer, everyone using that telephone or computer 
will be subject to surveillance, so there is no true particularity of person maintained.
95 
  In his analysis of the issue, Clifford Fishman finds that although relevant Fourth 
Amendment case law does not give conclusive support either for or against roving intercepts, 
there are strong arguments in favor of their constitutionality. He holds that roving intercept 
orders “describe the ‘place’ to be searched in a somewhat untraditional, but still sufficiently 
particular way” and argues that “if the Fourth Amendment is flexible enough to protect privacy 
against technological developments far beyond the contemplation of the founding fathers, then it 
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must also be flexible enough to permit investigators to preserve the basic mandate of the 
amendment’s particularity requirement in a novel way.”
96  
  Numerous additional questions arise regarding the difference in applying the new laws, 
as well as the old ones, to non-citizens vs. citizens, to terrorists vs. criminals, and to international 
vs. domestic terrorists. These are huge issues that concern the extent to which the Constitution 
applies to non-citizens, in the United States and elsewhere, and what rights non-citizens have. 
These issues raise potential problems, such as how to define terrorism and whether that 
definition should extend to citizens, as well as the danger that a loose definition might allow 
ordinary criminals to be encompassed by terrorism laws. These issues go well beyond 
communications technology and the laws related to it–the focus of this article–and are not 
covered here, although they have implications for the issues at hand. 
  c. Other critiques  
  Proponents of roving intercepts argue that without them authorities will see a “whole 
operation frustrated because a terrorist throws away a telephone and picks up another phone and 
then moves on.”
97 Critics argue that the new law will ensnarl many innocent people unrelated to 
investigations. Civil libertarians like Nadine Strossen argue that the new law, as it relates to 
roving intercepts, “goes far beyond” facilitating investigations based on individual suspicion. 
She uses the example of a suspected terrorist who sends e-mail from a public library computer 
terminal. If the computer is tapped, any of the other users, who have no connection to the 
suspect, will also have their communications intercepted.
98 The same critics contend that issuing 
nationwide warrants just allows law enforcement agents to “shop for friendly judges.”
99 Senator 
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Hatch counters that these provisions and others merely fix parts of the criminal code that 
formerly treated terrorists “with kid gloves.”
100 
  It is worth noting that although the ACLU does not exempt the laws at issue from its 
blanket criticism of all the new measures, when explicitly asked whether it would at least 
recognize that allowing public authorities to tap all phones used by the same person was 
eminently reasonable, it hinted that it is somewhat less troubled by the changes in the laws under 
discussion here than by many of the other measures.
101 Alan Dershowitz, a longtime defender of 
civil liberties, even went so far as to concede that roving intercepts are “a very good idea.”
102 
  The ACLU criticizes changes in FISA, which it charges allow authorities to “by-pass 
normal criminal procedures that protect privacy and take checks and balances out of the law.”
103  
Civil libertarians worry about USA Patriot's extension of the reach of FISA, which provides 
fewer protections than are provided for criminal cases, as the discussion above regarding full 
intercepts under FISA illustrates. (Civil libertarians’ concerns about pen/trap orders for e-mail 
are discussed in the section on protective technologies.) 
*** 
  I shall defer my own assessment of the legitimacy of the new legal adaptations to the 
liberalizing technologies and of their effects on the balance between individual rights and public 
safety and health, until the next three technologies and the laws concerning them are reviewed. 
For now it might serve to remind that the essay does not deal with the general legitimacy of 
FISA or the USA Patriot Act, but with some elements of these laws, specifically those that 
concern communications surveillance. This is significant to keep in mind because conclusions 
about other elements–military tribunals and indefinite detention of suspects, for instance–may be 
different than those about the surveillance laws at issue. 
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II.  PUBLIC PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGIES          
  The discussion now turns to three technologies that have the opposite profile of those 
explored so far: they enhance the capabilities of public authorities and raise fears that they will 
curtail individual rights. 
 
A.  Carnivore 
  Carnivore, a computer program that was unveiled by the FBI in July of 2000, is used to 
trace and seize Internet communications. To capture a suspect’s messages or trace messages sent 
to and from his account, public authorities must sort through a stream of many millions of   
messages, including those of many other users as well as those of the suspect. Some ISPs have 
the capability of doing this sorting themselves and will simply pass the appropriate information 
on to agents after a warrant or court order is presented. If an ISP is not capable of doing this kind 
of sorting, the FBI uses Carnivore to do it.
104 
  Carnivore runs as an application program on an operating system and works by screening 
e-mails and sorting them based on a “filter,” which tells the program which information to 
capture and which to merely let pass by. The filter can be set to sort out messages from a specific 
computer or e-mail address, or it can scan various packets to find a specific text string.
105 
Carnivore can be set to operate in two different modes: “pen” and “full.” In pen mode it will 
capture only the addressing information (which includes the e-mail addresses of the sender and 
recipient, as well as the subject line) while in full mode it will capture the entire content of a 
message.
106 Carnivore is designed to copy and store only information caught by the filter, thus 
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keeping agents from looking at any addressing information or e-mail content not covered in the 
court order.
107  
  Carnivore’s pen mode is of value to public authorities even if the messages themselves 
cannot be read, such as in the growing number of cases in which high power encryption is used, 
because the government benefits from an analysis of the addresses. For instance, it can use 
pen/trap orders to trace to whom a group of suspects address their e-mail. When used in this 
capacity, it would make more sense to call Carnivore (which hardly devours the messages, 
despite its name) a communications traffic analyzer.  
  As of the fall of 2000, the FBI said that it had used Carnivore “approximately 25 times in 
the last two years.”
108 The Carnivore program is stored in an FBI laboratory and only brought out 
when needed to fulfill a specific court order. After the court order has expired, the program is 
returned to the laboratory.
109    
          
B.  The Key Logger System and Magic Lantern 
  Despite the introduction of Carnivore, the government seems to be greatly hobbled by its 
inability to decrypt a rapidly growing proportion of all messages. To overcome this limitation, 
the FBI is introducing two new technologies to obtain a suspect’s password. A password can 
enter or exit the encryption/decryption process in four ways: going over a modem, retrieval from 
storage, entry into a keyboard, or a process working within the computer itself.
110 The Key 
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Logger System (KLS), developed by the FBI, has several components that work together to 
obtain someone’s password.
111  
  Once agents discover that information they have seized through a warranted search or 
intercepted with a proper court order is encrypted, they can obtain another warrant to install and 
retrieve the KLS.
112 In the case of Nicodemo Scarfo, who was suspected of racketeering, agents 
had to show both probable cause that Scarfo was involved in crime and probable cause that 
important information was installed on his computer in encrypted form. As in any warrant, the 
FBI had to specify the exact location of the computer on which the KLS would be installed.
113  
  Once installed, the KLS uses a “keystroke capture” device to record keystrokes as they 
are entered into a computer. It is not capable of searching or recording fixed data stored on the 
computer, or of intercepting electronic communications sent to and from the computer (which 
would require an intercept order, which is more difficult to get than a warrant). In order not to 
intercept inadvertently the content of communications, the KLS is designed so that it is unable to 
record keystrokes while a computer’s modem is in operation.
114 
  Because the KLS must be installed manually and covertly on a suspect’s computer, which 
involves breaking and entering, it is arguably more invasive than “back doors” and key escrow 
(which, as previously discussed, are not available, due mainly to opposition by civil libertarians 
and high-tech business interests).
115 Those who are shocked by this technology should consider 
the effects of high power encryption. As the Boston Globe’s technology reporter commented, 
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“techno-libertarians rightly howled when the feds tried to bar access to encryption software; now 
we must live with the consequences. The bad guys have encryption. The good guys must have 
counter-encryption tools.”
116  
  Recently, the FBI has revealed that it has been developing a less invasive technology. In 
November 2001, the FBI admitted that it had developed, but not yet implemented, a remote-
control approach called Magic Lantern that allows the FBI to put software on a computer that 
will record keystrokes typed without installing any physical device.
117 Like the KLS, Magic 
Lantern does not by itself decrypt e-mail, but can obtain the suspect’s password. The details of 
how it does this have not been released.
118 It is said to install itself on the suspect’s computer in a 
way similar to a Trojan horse computer virus. It disguises itself as ordinary, harmless code, then 
inserts itself onto a computer. For example, the FBI will have a box pop up when someone 
connects to the Internet reading something like “Click here to win.” When the user clicks on the 
box, the virus will enter the computer.
119 
 
C.  Evaluating the new technologies 
  Just as laws were put in place both before and after 9/11 to limit the concerns that new 
liberalizing technologies posed for public safety, measures have also been introduced that limit 
the use of new protective technologies and address the concerns they pose for individual rights. 
Most of the limitations on the use of Carnivore and the KLS were put in place as these 
technologies developed and before they were used, though there have also been “additions” to 
the checks placed on them. The shift from the KLS to Magic Lantern can be considered an 
improvement from a rights viewpoint because it will not require covert breaking and entering by 
a law enforcement agent to install it on a suspect’s office or home computer.  
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  Nevertheless, both Carnivore and the KLS have raised concerns on the part of privacy 
advocates and civil liberties groups. Critics are skeptical that the programs operate the way the 
FBI claims they do and are troubled by the degree of secrecy the FBI maintains regarding how 
the programs work.  
  Groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (CDT) have multiple arguments for why Carnivore should not be 
used at all. They argue that because, for e-mail, it is much harder to separate addressing 
information from content than for a phone call, Carnivore will not allow the FBI to do a pen/trap 
without seizing more information than authorized.
120 Privacy advocates also worry that 
Carnivore will scan through “tens of millions of e-mails and other communications from 
innocent Internet users as well as the targeted suspect,”
121 thus violating the Fourth 
Amendment.
122 The ACLU compares a Carnivore search to the FBI sending agents into a post 
office to “rip open each and every mail bag and search for one person’s letters” and to “tapping 
the entire phone exchange system, listening to all the conversations, and then keeping only the 
ones that are incriminating, instead of tapping a single phone line.”
123 A USA Today editorial 
stated that “once it’s in place, Carnivore acts as an unrestrained Internet wiretap, snooping 
through every Internet communication that comes within its reach.”
124  
  Officials at the FBI respond that Carnivore, when it is used properly, will pull out only 
the appropriate e-mails, and that its use is subject to strict internal review and requires the 
cooperation of technical specialists and ISP personnel, thus limiting the opportunities an 
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unscrupulous agent might have to abuse it. In Donald Kerr’s words, the FBI does not have “the 
right or the ability to just go fishing.”
125 
  A review of Carnivore conducted by the Illinois Institute of Technology concluded that 
although it does not completely eliminate the risk of capturing unauthorized information, 
Carnivore is better than any existing alternatives and should continue to be used.
126 However, the 
panel also determined that the FBI’s internal audit process is insufficient to protect against 
improper use.
127 Specifically, the operator implementing a Carnivore search selects either pen or 
full mode by clicking one box on a computer screen,
128 and because the program does not keep 
track of what kind of search has been run,
129 it is difficult to determine if an operator has used the 
program only as specified in the court order. The head of the panel commented: “Even if you 
conclude that the software is flawless and it will do exactly what you set it to do and nothing 
more, you still have to make sure that the legal, human and organizational controls are 
adequate.”
130 I turn to this matter below, when accountability is discussed. 
  There is a tendency to attribute to computers human attributes and talk or write about 
them as if they “sniff” and “snoop,” violate privacy, and so on. One day computers may achieve 
such human capabilities, but for now a computer does not ogle, snicker at, or get aroused by a 
picture of a nude person because it does not “see”; its “mind” processes merely ones and zeros. 
Thus, if millions of messages flow through a computer running Carnivore, none of them is 
“read” unless it is caught by the filter and passed on to a human observer.
131 Computers do not 
“read” or “scan” messages any more than phones “listen” to messages left in their voice mail 
box. The issue is what humans do–not machines. True, if new technological capabilities did not 
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exist or their use were fully banned–an old Luddite argument
132–the problem would not arise in 
the first place. However, as long as new technologies are available to criminal elements, it is 
hard to argue in favor of privileging them and blocking the government from using counter-
measures under the proper conditions. 
  The legality of the KLS was tested in the case of Nicodemo Scarfo, in which the FBI 
used the KLS to decrypt records implicating Scarfo in racketeering. Scarfo’s defense argued that 
the key logger records keystrokes typed in electronic communications and sent over a modem, 
and should therefore have required a full intercept order, rather than an easier to obtain search 
warrant. Though the FBI says that the KLS cannot record while a modem is in operation, thus 
protecting against the capture of electronic communications, Scarfo and the privacy advocates 
interested in the case were skeptical. During the trial, Scarfo was shown a hard copy of all of the 
keystrokes intercepted, but was unable to pick out anything that he recognized as being part of an 
electronic communication.
133  
  Scarfo also argued that the warrant used to install the KLS violated the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and therefore constituted a general search because it did 
not describe specifically what could be searched and seized.
134 The warrant in the case 
authorized FBI agents to “install and leave behind software, firmware, and/or hardware 
equipment which will monitor the inputted data entered on Nicodemo S. Scarfo’s computer in 
the TARGET LOCATION,” which was specified in great detail. The same warrant authorized 
the surreptitious breaking and entry into the target location to install and retrieve the KLS, and 
also authorized the FBI to seize business records “in whatever form they are kept.”
135 David 
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Sobel of EPIC said that since the warrant was issued to get one password, but the KLS recorded 
every keystroke typed, it was comparable to if a police officer got “a warrant to seize one book 
in your house, but was also allowed to haul out everything that’s in there.”
136 Although it is true 
that in the Scarfo case agents had to look through all keystrokes entered after the installation of 
the KLS in order to pick out the string that was his password, the FBI argues that this is similar 
to any search. If public authorities have a warrant to get someone’s account book from their 
office, they may have to look through many drawers and shelves before finding it.
137 In 
December of 2001, the judge in the Scarfo case ruled that the use of the KLS to obtain his 
password was legal and constituted neither a general search nor a form of surveillance.
138  
 
III.  ACCOUNTABILITY 
A.  Accountability, the second balance 
  The article opened by calling attention to the need for balance between individual rights 
and public safety and health, rather than one or the other predominating.  When the polity tilts 
too far toward safety or rights, such tilts are best corrected. The question hence arises what 
effects the new technologies have on the balance. There can be little doubt that (a) the 
liberalizing technologies have greatly hindered the work of public authorities in the area of 
communications surveillance; (b) new protective technologies to some extent overcome these 
difficulties. The same might be said (c) about new legislation that did adapt the old applicable 
laws to the new technologies. Finally (d) the 2001 attack on America changed the point (or zone) 
of balance by posing a new, credible threat to public safety and health. This still leaves open the 
question of whether the new measures, whether technological or legal, provide for much needed 
enhanced public safety or excessively intrude into individual rights. 
  This, in turn, raises the question of how generally to determine whether or not the polity 
is in the zone of balance. This is an issue with which the courts have struggled for generations; it 
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would take volumes to begin to do it justice. Also, I have dedicated some text to this issue 
elsewhere.
139 Briefly, I concluded that the course of a nation’s laws should not be corrected 
unless there is a compelling reason (a concept akin to “clear and present danger,” although not 
necessarily one that meets this criterion technically); unless the matter cannot be addressed by 
non-legal, voluntary means; and unless one can make the intrusion small and the gain (either in 
safety or in rights) considerable. Further specification draws on what a reasonable person would 
find sensible, taking into account that the Constitution is a living document whose interpretation 
has been adjusted through the ages.  
  These criteria can be applied to the issues discussed here. For example, in the post-9/11 
context, it is clear that the government should have greater powers to decrypt e-mail because: 
terrorism does pose a major threat; voluntary means to fight encrypted terrorist messages have 
not sufficed on the face of it; and enabling and allowing the government to decrypt e-mail 
messages is not more intrusive than tapping a phone and can be allowed under similar 
conditions. The authority to use roving wiretaps may pass the same test. (To reiterate, other 
public safety measures recently introduced that do not concern communications surveillance, 
such as requiring protestors to remove their disguises, are not discussed here and may very well 
not meet the criteria listed.)
140  
           To complete the judgment whether or not a given new measure that enhances the powers 
of public authorities is called for, I suggest that a second form of balancing needs to be 
considered that, arguably, in the matters at hand, may turn out to be decisive compared to the 
first form already discussed. It concerns not whether the government should be accorded new 
powers—but how closely it is held accountable regarding the ways it uses these powers. From 
this viewpoint, the key issue is not if certain powers–for example, the ability to decrypt e-mail–
should or should not be available to public authorities, but whether or not these powers are used 
legitimately and whether mechanisms are in place to ensure such usage. This is similar to passing 
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over the question of whether there is too much money in a vault in favor of asking how strong 
the locks are. (One may argue that, in effect, this is really one question because whether the sum 
is “too much” depends on the locks. Some would argue that whatever the quality of the locks, 
too much of one’s money should not be located in one bank, mutual fund, etc. This is surely the 
argument about government data banks. However safeguarded, libertarians oppose concentrated 
national databases.)   
  Although these two forms of balance have some similarities and points of overlap, they 
are quite distinct. Thus, to argue, as cyber-libertarians did, that the government should not be 
able to decrypt encoded messages, should not be allowed to demand from an ISP the addressing 
information for e-mail sent to and from a suspect’s account, and so on, is different from agreeing 
that such powers are justified so long as they are properly circumscribed and their use is duly 
supervised.   
  The balance sought here is not between the public interest and rights, but between the 
supervised and the supervisors. Deficient accountability opens the door to government abuses of 
power; excessively tight controls make for agents reluctant to act.   
  Thus, a case can be made that in the decades preceding the Church Commission, under 
most of Hoover’s reign, the FBI was insufficiently accountable, and that after the Commission’s 
rules were institutionalized, until 9/11, the FBI was excessively limited in what it was allowed to 
do, in the area of communications surveillance. Agents, fearing reprimands and damage to their 
careers, were often too reluctant to act. 
  To elaborate a bit:  It seems difficult to sustain the argument that the government should 
be unable to decrypt any messages or be unable to gain the authority to do so. After the first 
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, one of its principal masterminds used encryption to 
protect files on his laptop computer, even as he plotted to blow up commercial airlines.
141 
(Encrypted files were found on a computer used by Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants in the Afghan 
capital.
142) Few would argue that public authorities should be unable to decrypt such files, even, 
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say, after obtaining a warrant based on probable cause that the files included important 
information.   
  The issue hence becomes which limits will be set on what messages can be decrypted, 
who will verify that these limits are observed, and by what means. Similarly, regarding roving 
intercepts, the issue is not whether the government should have to get a warrant for each 
instrument of communication that the same suspect uses, but by what means it will be ensured 
that the government does not collect information about other people who use the same 
instruments of communication or the same computer terminal. The key issue is not whether 
communications in cyberspace should be exempted from the same type of public scrutiny to 
which mail and phone calls have historically been subject, as cyber-idealists had hoped,
143 but 
whether there are proper controls in place to protect against abuse.  
            The next step in assessing whether or not the American polity, in matters concerning 
communications surveillance, is currently excessively attentive to public safety or not willing to 
take needed measures out of excessive concern for rights, is hence to determine to what extent 
accountability has been built into the new powers granted to the government in response to the 
new technologies at hand and in reaction to 9/11. 
 
B.  Layers of accountability 
  1.  Limitations built into the law 
  Limitations on the use of new powers are written into the laws governing them and 
limitations on protective technologies are often built into the technologies themselves. Roving 
intercepts, and indeed any intercepts, are not granted without limits. Title III lays out a 
requirement for “minimization,” stated at follows: “Every order and extension thereof shall 
contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, 
shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception under this chapter, and must 
terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.”
144 
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  Such built-in guidelines are intended to limit the ability of public authorities to gather and 
use information not directly related to their investigations.
145 Practically, this means that agents 
are not allowed to record conversations that are unrelated to the subject of the investigation and 
should stop listening when irrelevant matters are being discussed. If agents are unsure if a 
seemingly innocent conversation might touch on a relevant subject at some point, agents are to 
conduct “spot-monitoring,” in which they tune in every few minutes to check, but only begin to 
record when appropriate.
146 
 In  Scott v. United States,
147 the Supreme Court found that an agent’s implementation of 
such guidelines must be evaluated under a “standard of objective reasonableness,” so that if 
circumstances make minimization difficult, failure by an agent to attempt it does not constitute a 
violation of the law
148. In addition, if investigators have reason to suspect a conspiracy involving 
a large number of people, they are justified in recording and listening to all conversations until 
they are certain who is innocent and who not.
149 Many critics point out that under any 
circumstances, minimization is voluntary and we must rely on our trust in law enforcement 
officers to do it properly, highlighting the importance of further layers of accountability, such as 
the exclusionary rule.
150 
  Although telephone wiretaps rely on human judgment in implementing minimization, 
new public protective technologies, if properly used, carry out much of the minimization 
function automatically. Carnivore’s filters, if set properly, act as a built-in minimization process, 
intercepting only what is appropriate. Although it might be capable of collecting all content that 
passes through it, in compliance with court orders it should be set to capture only data sent to and 
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from a specific user.
151 As mentioned before, data that does not fit the filter settings just passes 
through without being saved by Carnivore, and is therefore not seen by public authorities.
152 
  
  2.  Supervision within executive agencies 
  Numerous accountability mechanisms are built into the executive agencies of the 
government. Of course, FBI field agents are subject to numerous guidelines and supervisors 
whose job includes ensuring that these guidelines are abided by. They, in turn, report to still 
higher ranking supervisors. Moreover, when agents cross the line, internal reviews take place. In 
addition, the Attorney General’s office to some extent supervises what the FBI does. 
  For instance, as already mentioned, requests by the FBI to conduct communications 
surveillance under FISA must be approved by the Attorney General’s office before they are 
submitted to the FISC.  In some cases, court order or warrant requests never get past internal FBI 
approval procedures.  For example, in the investigation prior to 9/11 of Zacarias Moussaoui, the 
possible “20th hijacker” who did not make it onto an airplane because he was arrested before 
9/11 on immigration charges, the request by field agents to search his computer never made it 
past FBI attorneys, who found insufficient evidence to justify it.
153   
  
  3.  The courts  
  Once surveillance technology is available that makes possible such actions as scanning e-
mail or gaining to keys to decrypt messages, and once it is established in principle that the 
government will have access to such technology, the question for both sides becomes–under 
what conditions should the government be allowed to use it? Often the contest on this second 
level issue centers on the issuance of warrants and court orders.  
  Civil libertarians hold that court orders are issued too liberally, without due scrutiny. 
They argue that agents cannot be trusted to abide by minimization guidelines, so it is best not to 
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grant them court orders in the first place. Jerry Berman stated that some 1,000 intercept orders a 
year are approved under FISA, suggesting that this is a very large number.
154 In fact, only around 
10,000 intercept orders have been granted under FISA since its creation in 1979,
155 amounting to 
fewer than 1,000 a year.   
  Civil libertarians point to the fact that the FISC has only denied one request for 
surveillance in its entire history as evidence that the standards for receiving a FISA intercept 
order are lower than for receiving a Title III order.
156 Though applications for intercept orders are 
rarely turned down by the FISC, public safety advocates point out that it is embarrassing and 
damaging to one’s record and career to be turned down by the FISC, and as a result agents are 
reluctant to request warrants even when they seemed justified.
157 Moreover, if the FISC finds 
that there is not sufficient justification, it tends to return the request for further documentation 
rather than denying the request outright, which accounts for there being next to no outright 
refusals.
158 As mentioned above, some requests never get past the Attorney General’s office. 
Also, FISA applications need to meet preset guidelines and must include a statement of the 
means by which the surveillance will be conducted, as well as a statement of proposed 
minimization procedures.
159 
  Although civil libertarians typically are much more favorably disposed toward courts 
than toward the administrative parts of the government, they fear that judges might be unable or 
disinclined to curb law enforcement agents.
160 First, judges are either elected or politically 
appointed, making them subject to the influence of public opinion, especially since 9/11. In 
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addition, it has been suggested that judges are less accountable outside their home jurisdictions 
and might thus be less cautious in granting, and less diligent in enforcing proper implementation 
of, warrants and court orders they issue that apply to other jurisdictions, as allowed by the USA 
Patriot Act.  Judge Meskill, in his concurrence with the ruling in United States v. Rodriguez, 
warned that “judges may be more hesitant to authorize excessive interceptions within their 
territorial jurisdiction, in their own back yard so to speak, than in some distant, perhaps 
unfamiliar, part of the country. Congress determined that the best method of administering 
intercept authorizations included territorial limitation on the power of judges to make such 
authorizations.”
161 If this is true, it would weaken the courts as an accountability mechanism for 
nationwide warrants. 
  In addition to the requirements that need to be met to get a warrant or court order in the 
first place, courts ensure that law enforcement agents act within the limits of the power granted 
to them by suppressing evidence that is collected illegally. The exclusionary rule–that evidence 
collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from a trial against the 
suspect–was not originally written into the Constitution, but was established in the Supreme 
Court case Boyd v. United States
162 and later re-affirmed in Weeks v. United States.
163 It has 
since been diluted in more ways than one.
164 Still, evidence collected illegally will be 
suppressed. This serves not only to protect the suspect after a violation occurs, but also to deter 
inappropriate searches because agents know that if they do not follow the correct procedures, the 
culprits might go free. 
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  4.  Congress 
  Under our system of checks and balances, Congress, of course, is supposed to oversee the 
work of the executive branch and its agencies. It has many instruments for doing so, including 
requiring heads of agencies and other high ranking officials to respond to written questions, 
testify before congressional committees, and turn over documents; conducting hearings in which 
civil libertarians and others can make their case; ordering the General Accounting Office to 
conduct a study; and more. 
  A survey of the extent to which Congress provides another layer of accountability 
regarding issues such as those covered here, above and beyond what is provided by the agencies 
themselves and by the courts, is well beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, though, 
that civil libertarians argue that many of the measures included in USA Patriot (including those 
explored here) were enacted in a great rush, without the usual hearings and deliberations.
165 
Supporters of the public authorities point out that after 9/11 it was assumed that there were other 
“sleeper” terrorist agents in the United States and that other attacks were imminent, and argue 
that therefore the rush was justified. Indeed, they held that expanded powers should have been 
given well before 9/11.
166 Moreover, hearings and other reviews of the issues at hand, such as 
Carnivore, were conducted before 9/11.
167 
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  5.  The public 
  The ultimate source of oversight is the citizenry, informed and alerted by a free press and 
civil liberties advocates and briefed by public authorities about their needs. To be fully effective 
in overseeing the issues at hand, civil libertarians argue that the public must be informed about 
the inner workings of the protective technologies, while public authorities claim that such 
disclosures would inform terrorists and other criminals about how to circumvent the 
technologies, thus rendering them useless. Specifically, since the existence of Carnivore was 
made public, numerous parties have demanded access to information about how it works. The 
ACLU filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to get its source code, which reveals 
what a program is intended to do and how it operates.
168 The Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, a privacy advocacy group, filed an FOIA request to gain a copy of all documents relating 
to Carnivore.
169 In addition, numerous ISPs who might be asked to cooperate in installing 
Carnivore wanted guarantees that the program worked as claimed and that there would be 
sufficient controls to keep law enforcement agents from capturing more than what was covered 
in the court order.
170  
  In the Scarfo case, the judge joined civil liberties groups in demanding that the FBI 
release information on how the KLS works, arguing that he could not rule on whether or not its 
use was legal without knowing how the technology worked. The judge said he would review the 
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technology secretly.
171 This solution satisfied neither the civil libertarians nor the FBI. David 
Sobel of EPIC said the matter raised “very basic questions of accountability. The suggestion that 
the use of high-tech law enforcement investigative techniques should result in a departure from 
our tradition of open judicial proceedings is very troubling.”
172 Donald Kerr, assistant director of 
the FBI’s laboratory division, stated that the disclosure of certain information about the KLS 
would “compromise the use of this technology...and jeopardize the safety of law enforcement 
personnel.”
173  
  Secrecy also remains one of the key objections to the use of roving intercepts under 
FISA. FISA was established in the mid-1970s, after the public was alarmed to learn of the 
activities of President Nixon and to discover that the NSA had been illegally intercepting 
telegraph and telephone calls.
174 A congressional committee was created to investigate, and 
found that nearly every president had authorized warrantless communications surveillance, often 
for political purposes.
175  Essentially, agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and NSA were able to 
conduct surveillance without going through normal criminal procedures. The Department of 
Justice launched its own in-house investigation, resulting in new guidelines for both domestic 
and foreign intelligence investigations. To prevent future abuses, Congress passed FISA in 1978 
to spell out what the NSA (and other intelligence agencies) could and could not do.
176 The NSA 
had insisted that its activities–especially regarding its methods and technologies–would be 
severely compromised if discussed in open court. In response, FISA authorized the formation of 
a special federal court whose proceedings could be completely secret.
177 
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  In short, while the public cannot be informed about all the workings of all the protective 
technologies, such as Carnivore, because this would impair the usefulness of the technologies, 
the public can act as the ultimate enforcer of accountability.  
 
C.  In conclusion 
  To determine whether or not a specific public policy measure is legitimate entails more 
than establishing whether or not it significantly enhances public safety and is minimally 
intrusive, whether it further undermines already endangered civil rights, or makes it more 
difficult to deal with public needs. It entails rendering a judgment as to whether or not those who 
employ any new powers are sufficiently accountable to the various overseers–ultimately the 
citizenry. Some powers are inappropriate no matter what oversight is provided. However, for 
those at issue here, the main question is whether there is sufficient accountability. The remedy, if 
accountability is found deficient (or excessive), is to adjust accountability and not to deny the 
measure altogether.  This holds, though, I grant, only if one makes one key assumption 
examined in the next section. 
  Whether the specific powers given to the government in regard to the matters at hand are 
sustaining or undermining the balance between rights and safety depends on how strong each 
layer of accountability is, whether higher layers enforce lowers ones, and whether there are full 
complements of layers or not. It is true that there can be too much accountability, such that law 
enforcement agents would be reluctant to act due to fear that they would be penalized by 
superiors, by the courts, or by Congress, or be skewered by the press. However, there have been 
no signs of this since 9/11. 
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IV.  THE ULTIMATE QUESTION 
  Accountability is ultimately a matter of trust. Plato is said to have raised the issue in 
asking, who will guard the guardians,
178 or, as it is put in Latin, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Others attribute the question to the Roman satirist Juvenal, who wrote around 2000 years ago.
179 
The issue, though, is very much with us. If we do not trust the cops on the beat, we may ask their 
captains to keep them under closer supervision. If we do not trust the police, we may call on the 
civil authorities, such as mayors, to scrutinize the police. We may call on the other branches of 
government–the courts, especially–to serve as checks and balances. However, if we believe that 
the mayors are corrupt and the judges cannot be trusted either, we have little to fall back on other 
than the fourth estate. Yet the media, too, is often distrusted.
180  
  The question, then, is whom we should distrust and how much. If basically no authority 
or media figure is trustworthy and “The System” is corrupt, we face a much larger challenge than 
if, in a few instances, public authorities intercept more e-mail than they are supposed to, or tap 
some phones they ought not. If someone believes this, she should either move to another country 
or fight for an entirely new political system.   
  In contrast, if only some cops, captains, mayors, and other public authorities are corrupt, 
we have good reason to watch out for such individuals, but not to doubt the political system. We 
ought, then, to work to improve the various layers of accountability, but also realize that the fact 
that critics can always come up with some horror stories does not necessarily mean that they are 
typical of the system. 
  Although I cannot justify it within the confines of this article, I hold the latter position. 
Hence, I suggest that one best ignores both claims by public authorities that no strengthening of 
accountability is needed and the shrillest civil libertarian outcries that sound as if no one is to be 
trusted.  Instead, one is likely to favor reforms that will enhance accountability, rather than 
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denying public authorities the tools they need to do their work (although not necessarily granting 
them all those they request) in a world in which new technologies have made their service more 
difficult and in which the threat to public safety has vastly increased. 
 
 
 
 